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SUSTAINABLE DEBT
G. Bloise, H. Polemarchakis and Y. Vailakis∗
October 14, 2018
Debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium due solely to the rep-
utation of debtors for repayment; that is, even absent collateral or legal
sanctions available to creditors. Under incomplete markets, when the rate
of interest (net of growth) is recurrently negative, self-insurance is more
costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by the im-
plicit threat of loss of risk-sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private
debt credibly circulates as a form of inside money and, in general, is not
valued as a speculative bubble; it is distinct from outside money. Compet-
itive equilibria with self-enforcing debt exist under a suitable hypothesis
of gains from trade.
Keywords: Rate of interest, self-enforcing debt, reputational debt, incomplete
markets, competitive equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom asserts that debt is not sustainable, unless it is secured
by collateral or by sanctions that creditors can exercise against debtors upon
default. We argue that, instead, creditors can rely solely on the benefits debtors
derive from the ability to borrow and, as a consequence, their reputation for
repayment. We identify the implicit enforcement mechanism, and we show the
existence of competitive equilibria with unsecured debt. Importantly, debt is not
valued as a speculative bubble, but it reflects fairly the value of future repay-
ments; it is distinct from outside money.
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When creditors have no legal rights whatsoever, debtors are able to borrow
only if they can maintain a reputation for repayment. After Eaton and Gerso-
vitz [18] first pointed this out, Bulow and Rogoff [14] presented their celebrated
critique of the reputational theory of unsecured debt: if the loss of reputation
cannot prevent debtors from continuing to save in financial markets after default,
and they maintain access to cash-in-advance insurance contracts, then reneging
on their debt obligations becomes, eventually, profitable. Indeed, debtors that
have reached the upper bound on liabilities may prefer to declare bankruptcy and
to divert saved repayments to acquire cash-in-advance contracts. This is feasible
and, as shown by Bulow and Rogoff [14], generates higher utility as long as the
upper bound on debt is strictly positive. Creditors anticipate debtors’ incentives
to default and provide no loans at all.
In contrast to this conventional view, Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22] showed that
debt is sustainable in economies with a complete asset market when rate of
interest and debt limits are determined endogenously to clear markets. Their
insight relies on an equivalence between speculative bubbles and self-enforcing
debt, a variation of the bubble equivalence theorem in Kocherlakota [26]. At a
competitive equilibrium with a speculative bubble, an asset with no fundamental
value allows for intertemporal consumption smoothing, exactly as money does
in the monetary economy in Bewley [10, 11]. At a competitive equilibrium with
self-enforcing debt, instead, each individual issues private debt and this is valued
in the market as a speculative bubble. In other terms, the privileges of issuing
the speculative bubble are assigned to individuals as opposed to an asset in
positive net supply. In fact, incentives to default disappear because individuals
are allowed to exactly roll-over outstanding debt period by period and, as a
consequence, no effective repayment is enforced.1
We revisit the classic issue of whether reputation for repayment alone can
sustain debt in competitive markets when saving provides self-insurance upon
default. We treat unsecured debt as uncontingent, and we focus on economies
with incomplete markets. Our main objective is to show that, in the presence of
uninsurable risks, reputation provides an effective mechanism for debt enforce-
ment. Differently from a situation with complete markets, debt cannot be rolled
over and, as such, it does not circulate as a speculative bubble. This reveals a
substantive failure of the claim in Bulow and Rogoff [14].
1In the working paper version, Bulow and Rogoff [14] explicitly ruled out such Ponzi-type
reputational contracts by the assumption of a finite market value of the entire income stream
of the debtor.
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The analysis here extends and complements our previous work. In Bloise et al.
[13], in fact, we identified sufficient conditions for the extension of Bulow and
Rogoff [14] to incomplete markets, and we also provided examples where the
claim fails because of uninsurable risks. For given prices of tradable securities,
default is unavoidable when the greatest valuation of the debtor’s endowment is
finite, whereas debt can be credibly sustained by the reputation for repayment if
only the least valuation is finite. Disparities in the valuation of future incomes are
unavoidable under incomplete markets, as these contingent claims are not traded
and, hence, are not priced by the market. The absence of arbitrage opportunities
only imposes an upper bound and a lower bound on present values.2 We here
further refine the understanding of the implicit debt enforcement mechanism and,
importantly, we develop the analysis in a competitive equilibrium framework.
Prices are determined by market clearing and conditions for sustainable debt
emerge endogenously. At a competitive equilibrium, indeed, prices of tradable
securities typically ensure a finite least valuation of the aggregate endowment,
whereas the greatest valuation is infinite
How can debt be self-enforcing? Consider a situation in which the value of a
claim to the entire future income of a debtor is finite, as in Bulow and Rogoff [14].
This provides an upper bound on the debtor’s repayment capacity (the natural
debt limit) and rules out the debt roll-over regime that occurrs in Hellwig and
Lorenzoni [22]. Upon default, no further debt can be issued and the debtor shall
have to rely on self-insurance. When markets are complete, saved repayments can
be invested in specific portfolios of securities that replicate equivalent risk-sharing
advantages of debt contracts. As an interest accrues from these investments,
saved repayments more than compensate for the cost of self-insurance. When
markets are incomplete, however, contingent claims for an equivalent insurance
may not be tradable and, without issuing debt, risk-sharing contracts can only
be acquired at a higher cost. Therefore, the loss due to the increased cost of self-
insurance may well exceed the gain from default and this provides an implicit
incentive to debt repayment.
When a risk-free bond is the only available security, for instance, consumption
smoothing can only be obtained with uncontingent claims. When rates of inter-
est remains recurrently negative for a long phase with some probability (though
somehow positive on average), the cost of self-insurance grows prohibitively high.
This is so because saving depreciates at a negative rate of interest. When debt
2See, for instance, LeRoy and Werner [27] on this general principle of finance.
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can be issued, instead, insurance obtains at a sensible lower cost, as outstanding
debt can be refinanced at a negative rate of interest. Hence, debt is a supe-
rior instrument and repayments are implicitly enforced by the threat of loosing
borrowing privileges.
We show that, under incomplete markets, debt roll-over in general fails at a
competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing debt. The argument is not evident,
and it requires us to extend a method based on the dominant root (Perron-
Frobenius) approach.3 The long-term rate of interest is only ambiguously iden-
tified under incomplete markets and dominant roots provide bounds on its es-
timates. When the long-term rate of interest is unambiguously positive, in a
roll-over regime, debt explodes On the contrary, it vanishes over time, along
with trade, when the long-term rate of interest is unambiguously negative. Nei-
ther case is consistent with a competitive equilibrium in which trade persists.
When long-term rate of interest is never positive and occasionally negative, debt
is sometimes refinanced at a discount and, in a roll-over regime, additional debt
is in fact sustainable at equilibrium, a contradiction. As a result, a necessary
condition for persistent debt roll-over is that the long-term rate of interest be
unambiguously zero. This imposes excessively severe limitations, as rate of in-
terest will need to adjust upwards and downwards to clear markets.
We also establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing
debt. Our approach exploits the dominant root to show that trade occurs at equi-
librium. We perturb the economy by introducing a legal sanction: upon default
a small fraction of the endowment is confiscated. This is sufficient to enforce
repayment of any debt not exceeding the present value of confiscated resources.
As a result, borrowing and lending occur in the perturbed economy and, at a
competitive equilibrium, a claim into each debtor’s entire future income is finite.
We then progressively remove the auxiliary sanction and consider the limit with
no confiscation. This is a competitive equilibrium of the original economy and
trade occurs under a suitable gains from trade hypothesis: the implicit value of
a claim into each debtor’s entire income is (robustly) infinite at autarky. Indeed,
3For complete markets, Alvarez and Jermann [5] and Hansen and Scheinkman [20] follow a
similar approach. Their purpose is to derive a lower bound for the volatility of the permanent
component of asset pricing kernels. Our purpose instead is to provide necessary conditions at a
competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing debt for individuals to exactly roll over existing debt
period by period. The analysis of the dominant root under incomplete markets was developed
in Bloise et al. [13] for Markov pricing kernels with strictly positive transitions. An extension
is necessary because the Markov property generally fails at a competitive equilibrium with
self-enforcing debt when some risks are uninsurable.
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as this claim has a finite value in the perturbed economy, autarky cannot be the
limit as the perturbation is removed. The dominant root is used to convert this
intuition into an accurate argument.
We complement our analysis with an exploration of incentives to default for
exogenously given Markov pricing kernels. This is the privileged framework of
the sovereign debt literature, where the pricing kernel is interpreted as the val-
uation of foreign investors who provide credit under full commitment.4 Under
incomplete markets, when no future borrowing is the punishment for default, we
show that debt may be sustainable when foreign investors are risk-averse and
risk premia vary along the business cycle.5 When the pricing kernel is sufficiently
volatile, the foreign investors’ value of a claim into the borrower’s entire future
income is finite (high implied rates of interest), but the value of the claim be-
comes infinite when evaluated using other legitimate state prices (low implied
rates of interest). On one hand, high implied rates of interest preclude debt roll-
over or, according to Bulow and Rogoff [14], Ponzi-type reputational contracts.
On the other hand, low implied rates of interest render borrowing more appeal-
ing, and saving after default more costly. When these effects trade off, default is
not profitable and debt is sustained by the mere reputation for repayment.
We briefly relate our contribution to previous studies in two separate branches
of literature: sovereign debt and money. The objection of Bulow and Rogoff
[14] to the reputation argument for repayment posed a powerful challenge to
the notion that the threat of exclusion from credit markets, by itself, supports
sovereign borrowing. As a consequence, the literature evolved in three distinct
directions. In a first line of research, as in Bulow and Rogoff [15], debt repayment
is sustained by direct punishments, interpreted as the outcome of interferences
with the debtor’s transactions upon default. A second line of research, as in
Kletzer and Wright [25], develops the idea that sovereigns repay because they
are worried about the repercussions of default, for instance, for the credit market.
In a third line of research, finally, incentives to repay sovereign debt arise from
possible broader adverse effects on a borrower’s reputation, as in Cole and Kehoe
4This framework is inspired by Eaton and Gersovitz [18] and extensively studied, among
others, by Aguiar and Amador [2], Auclert and Rognlie [8] and Wright [31]. Eaton and Fer-
nandez [17] and Panizza et al. [28] provide comprehensive reviews of the traditional literature.
5Recent quantitative work on sovereign default risk, in Arellano [6], Arellano and Rama-
narayanan [7] and Hatchondo et al. [21], moves away from the traditional risk-neutral pricing
to provide a better understanding of risk premia, the term-structure of interest rates and
movements along the business cycle.
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[16]. All these previous studies take their cue from the critique of Bulow and
Rogoff [14] and explore alternative, and more effective, mechanisms for debt
enforcement. We, instead, rely solely on the debtor’s reputation for repayment
and show a limited validity of the claim of Bulow and Rogoff [14] with residual
uninsurable risks.
The absence of debt roll-over provides a relevant insight into the relation be-
tween inside money and outside money. When markets are complete, Hellwig
and Lorenzoni [22] establish an equivalence between an equilibrium with self-
enforcing debt (inside money) and an equilibrium with unbacked public debt
(outside money). We show that this coincidence in general fails under incom-
plete markets. With uninsurable risks, an equilibrium with self-enforcing debt
is distinct from a Bewley [10, 11] monetary equilibrium. Self-enforcing debt is
backed by the credible promise of future repayments, as the implicit mechanism
guarantees that outstanding claims are honored. In particular, the value of a
claim into the debtor’s future income (the natural debt limit) is finite, as in
any competitive equilibrium with full commitment. In the monetary economy
of Bewley [10, 11] the (unmodelled) absence of enforcement mechanisms pre-
vents credit markets from operating and an unbacked currency plays a relevant
social role in helping individuals smooth their consumption over time. Money
only circulates as a speculative bubble and requires an infinite present value of
future income. A relevant implication of our argument is that self-enforcing debt
is consistent with empirical tests ruling out speculative bubbles and ascertaining
dynamic efficiency of the economy, as in Abel et al. [1].
A more counter-intuitive equivalence between money and credit is found by
Gu et al. [19] under special assumptions on trading arrangements. Indeed, they
show that changes in credit conditions are neutral because real balances respond
endogenously so as to conserve total liquidity, and welfare.6 On the contrary, our
analysis reveals that credit and money are different sources of liquidity under in-
complete markets or, else, that their equivalence is an artefact of the hypothesis
of complete markets. In fact, in general, a competitive equilibrium with credit
(inside money) differs from a competitive equilibrium with (outside) money. Fur-
thermore, neutrality fails even under the most favorable scenario, in which money
is undominated as an asset and is not demanded because of liquidity preference.
6The analysis in Gu et al. [19] is broader, though limited to a specific setting, because the
nominal interest is positive and money is held for liquidity purposes even though dominated as
a credit instrument. In the absence of additional transaction constraints, instead, dominated
money would not be valued in our set up or that in Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22].
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Our argument has indirect implications for monetary policy. Indeed, we show
that the market is able to provide endogenous sources of liquidity. Because this
endogenous form of liquidity only relies on reputation and does not require any
legal enforcement, regulation may not be effective and self-enforcing debt may
interfere with the objectives of monetary policy. For instance, when a counter-
cyclical policy requires a restrictive intervention, the inside money channel may
instead provide an expansion of liquidity. Furthermore, the inside supply of liq-
uidity may be more vulnerable to autonomous revisions of expectations and elude
the stabilizing action of monetary policy.
We organize the paper as follows: We begin with the presentation of a simple
example in §2. In §3 we describe the economy and define a competitive equilib-
rium with self-enforcing debt. As debt sustainability depends on long-term rates
of interest, in §4 we develop our dominant root approach. In §5 we employ the
dominant root method to identify a necessary condition for debt roll-over that,
when markets are incomplete, can only be satisfied in singular situations. In §6
we establish the existence of an equilibrium with trade and effective sustain-
able debt. In §7 we further explore the incentives to debt repayment for a given
Markov pricing kernel. Finally, we present some concluding remarks. All proofs
we collect in Appendix A; in Appendices B, C and D we provide additional
material.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
How can debt be sustainable when it is not secured by collateral or legal sanc-
tions? We present, here, a simple example in order to provide the underlying
intuition and to disentangle the enforcing mechanism. When the rate of interest
is recurrently negative, self-insurance may be too costly, and debt may provide
insurance services more efficiently than other instruments. Thus, debt may be
implicitly secured by the threat of diminished insurance opportunities upon de-
fault, contrary to what Bulow and Rogoff [14] claimed. In the example, these
conditions are determined ad hoc for heuristic purposes. As our general analy-
sis illustrates, however, they will naturally emerge at a competitive equilibrium
under incomplete market.
At each period, there are two states of nature, S = {l, h}, occurring with
equal probability. A risk-free (discount) bond is the only security, and its price
is either qh > 1 or ql < 1. An individual can trade the risk-free bond over time,
issuing debt when needed, under no commitment for repayment. As in Bulow
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and Rogoff [14], denial of future credit is the only punishment for default.
Preferences on consumption streams are given by a conventional discounted
expected utility; that is,
U ((ct)
∞
t=0) = E0
∞∑
t=0
δtu (ct) ,
where u : R+ → R is the utility function, and δ in (0, 1) is the discount factor.
To simplify computations, the borrower is risk-neutral (that is, u (c) = c) and
the endowment is constant: e > 0. We also assume that the discount factor δ
lies in (0, ql). This ensures that the individual is sufficiently impatient and will
never save after default. Autarky is, thus, the reservation utility.
We consider a simple consumption plan in which outstanding debt remains
constant over time. This is not a roll-over regime because repayments occur
and, though the rate of interest is recurrently positive along some path, debt is
not exploding. The outstanding stock of debt is d > 0, while consumption is,
depending on the current price of the bond,
cs = e+ (qs − 1) d > 0.
The feature of this plan is that, when interest is positive (ql < 1), some resources
are devoted to debt service; when the rate of interest is negative (qh > 1), debt
can be refinanced at no cost and excess resources are diverted to consumption.
The stock of debt remains unaltered over time.7 Is default profitable under these
conditions?
Because of our simplifying assumptions, the accounting is straightforward. The
expected discounted utility conditional on no default is
Us (d) = e+ (qs − 1) d
+
(
δ
1− δ
)(
e+
(
qh − 1
2
)
d+
(
ql − 1
2
)
d
)
.
As saving is never optimal, autarky is the expected discounted utility upon de-
fault; that is,
Us (0) = e+
(
δ
1− δ
)
e.
As a matter of fact, default is unprofitable if and only if(
δ
1− δ
)(
qh − 1
2
)
≥ (1− ql) +
(
δ
1− δ
)(
1− ql
2
)
.
7In the spirit of the arbitrage argument in Bulow and Rogoff [14], we exhibit a plan for the
borrower independently of optimality and equilibrium conditions. However, though inessential,
it is worth noticing that the plan is optimal if d > 0 is exactly the debt limit.
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The right hand-side is the value of saved repayments, whereas the left hand-side
is the value of excess consumption afforded by refinancing debt at a negative
rate of interest. The condition is certainly satisfied for fixed qh > 1 provided
that ql < 1 is sufficiently close to unity. Thus, debt is sustainable.
The example clarifies why the arbitrage argument of Bulow and Rogoff [14]
fails under incomplete markets. When debt is not rolled over, repayments are
necessarily enforced beginning from some contingency. By defaulting, the bor-
rower saves on these repayments at the cost of no further debt in the future.
When markets are complete, saved repayments can be used to pay upfront for
the same insurance as without default and, as a result, denial of future credit
bears no effective cost. This arbitrage is precluded in the example because mar-
kets are incomplete. Indeed, the rate of interest may remain negative for a long
phase. Before default, the borrower benefits from refinancing outstanding debt.
After default, the upfront value of a positive net consumption can be arbitrarily
large, because a negative rate of interest accrues on savings. Thus, default entails
a large cost, whereas the gain from saved repayments may be relatively small
(and, in fact, vanishes when ql = 1).
Debt cannot be rolled over in this example. In fact, it is bounded by the least
present value of future endowment (the natural debt limit); that is,
d ≤
∞∑
t=0
qtle =
(
1
1− ql
)
e.
This rules out Ponzi games and enforces recurrent repayments. In Hellwig and
Lorenzoni [22], instead, borrowers simply roll over their debt obligations and
no debt repayment is enforced. This situation occurs only under implausibly
restrictive conditions at a competitive equilibrium when markets are incomplete
(see §5).
In the sovereign debt literature, beginning with Eaton and Gersovitz [18], the
pricing kernel is determined by the valuation of foreign investors whose commit-
ment is enforced by the legal system. When markets are complete, this induces
a finite value of the sovereign’s future income and debt is unsustainable, as es-
tablished by Bulow and Rogoff [14]. Under incomplete markets, instead, foreign
investors’ valuation may be finite and, yet, debt may be sustainable. To accom-
modate this in our example, we can assume that the typical foreign lender is
risk-averse and risk premium is time-varying because of the international busi-
ness cycle. The price of the bond is determined by marginal rates of substitution;
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that is,
qh = δ
∗
(
µhh
u′ (c∗h)
u′ (c∗h)
+ µhl
u′ (c∗l )
u′ (c∗h)
)
,(2.1)
ql = δ
∗
(
µlh
u′ (c∗h)
u′ (c∗l )
+ µll
u′ (c∗l )
u′ (c∗l )
)
,(2.2)
where (c∗l , c
∗
h) are the foreign investors’ consumption levels, δ
∗ in (0, 1) is their
discount factor and µ denotes the transition probabilities. By discounting, the
present value of sovereign’s endowment is certainly finite when computed at
state prices corresponding to discounted marginal utilities. Hence, when markets
are incomplete, the valuation of foreign investors may be finite even though the
borrower has no incentive to default.8
Along the lines of this simple example, in Appendix B, we consider a com-
petitive economy with two risk-neutral individuals in which gains from trade
arise because of differences in marginal utilities.9 Depending on idiosyncratic
shocks, each individual will be issuing debt, recovering it and providing credit
to the other individual. As in the previous example, debt cannot be rolled over
because the natural debt limit is finite. If debt were to exceed the natural limit,
its value would be growing unboundedly over time. As the debt of an individual
is balanced by the credit of the other individual, this situation would necessarily
imply an over-accumulation of assets for the creditor and thus a violation of the
transversality condition.
3. THE ECONOMY
3.1. Time and uncertainty
The economy extends over an infinite horizon, T = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}. Uncertainty
is represented by a probability space, (Ω,F , µ) and a filtration (Ft)t∈T of σ-
algebras. To simplify, and to avoid issues of integrability, we assume that, for
every t in T, Ft is a σ-algebra generated by a finite partition of Ω. Given a
8A more speculative way of explaining this property is that, under incomplete markets, the
hypothesis of high implied rates of interest (that is, a finite present value of the endowment)
may hold true at some state prices and fail at some other state prices. Foreign investors’
marginal valuation corresponds to state prices for which implied rates of interest are high.
This does not exclude that the value is infinite for some other state prices.
9The example is rather convoluted. In general, it is hard to construct simple competitive
equilibria under incomplete markets. When risk is uninsured, shocks alter the distribution of
wealth and prices need to vary in order to guarantee market clearing (see, for instance, Kehoe
and Levine [24, Proposition 7]). Furthermore, when debt is self-enforcing, the endogenous value
of default has to be determined explicitly, adding an independent complication.
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state of nature ω in Ω, at every period t in T, µ (Ft (ω)) > 0, where Ft (ω) =
∩{Et ∈ Ft : ω ∈ Et} represents the (publicly) available information. Throughout
the analysis, we refer to any of such primitive events as a contingency. In the
equivalent event-tree representation of uncertainty, a contingency corresponds to
a date-event or a node.
3.2. Adapted processes
Let L be the linear space of all adapted processes with values in R, i.e., of all
maps f : T × Ω → R such that, for every t in T, ft : Ω → R is Ft-measurable,
and let Lt be the space of such Ft-measurable maps. An adapted process f in L
is positive (respectively, strictly positive, uniformly positive) whenever, at every
t in T, ft (ω) ≥ 0 (respectively, ft (ω) > 0, ft (ω) ≥  > 0), for all ω in Ω. As
usual, L+ denotes the positive cone of L.
3.3. Preferences and endowments
There is a finite set I of individuals. For every individual i in I, the con-
sumption space Ci is L+, the positive cone of L, and the endowment is ei in
Ci.
Assumption 3.1 (Endowment) The endowment ei in Ci is uniformly positive
and uniformly bounded with respect to the aggregate; that is, for some suffi-
ciently large u > 0 and some sufficiently small l > 0, at every t in T,
let ≤ eit ≤ uet,
where the strictly positive process e in L+ is the aggregate endowment.
To simplify, we impose restrictive assumptions on preferences, though this
is unnecessary for most of our analysis. Every individual is characterized by a
canonical expected discounted utility. Preferences over the consumption space
Ci are induced, at every period t in T, by
U it
(
ci
)
= Et
∑
s∈T
δsui
(
cit+s
)
,
where δ in (0, 1) is the common discount factor. A sort of Strong Inada Condition
helps the arguments by ensuring strictly positive consumption.
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Assumption 3.2 (Utility) Per-period utility ui : R++ → R is smooth, smoothly
strictly increasing and smoothly strictly concave. Furthermore, it is bounded
from above and satisfies the Strong Inada Condition, namely,
lim
ci→0
ui
(
ci
)
= −∞.
A consumption plan ci in Ci is individually rational if, at every t in T,
U it
(
ci
) ≥ U it (ei) .
Notice that individual rationality is imposed at all contingencies and not only
ex ante. An allocation c in C specifies a consumption plan ci in Ci for every
individual i in I. It is feasible if, at every t in T,∑
i∈I
cit ≤
∑
i∈I
eit.
The space of individually rational and feasible allocations is denoted by C (e). A
simple lemma clarifies that individually rational consumption will be uniformly
positive due to the Strong Inada Condition.
Lemma 3.1 (Lower bound on consumption) When the aggregate endowment e
in L+ is uniformly positive, every individually rational consumption plan ci in
Ci is also uniformly positive.
3.4. Competitive markets
Short-term securities are sequentially traded in competitive markets. Available
assets may not allow for all contingent transfers; that is, markets are sequentially
incomplete. As specific features play no direct role in our analysis, we opt for a
parsimonious primitive description of the set of securities via pricing and pay-
off functionals. Our framework encompasses sequentially complete markets as a
particular case. In some of our analysis, we restrict attention to economies in
which only the risk-free bond is available.
A finite set J of securities is traded over time in the asset market. At every
period t in T, security j in J is described by a market price qjt in Lt and a possibly
contingent payoff Rjt,t+1 in Lt+1 at the following period. A trading plan z in Z
is an adapted process in LJ , where zt in Zt is the portfolio of securities held in
period t in T. Portfolios are priced by the linear functional qt : Zt → Lt and
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yield a contingent payoff according to the linear functional Rt,t+1 : Zt → Lt+1.
Notice that, when the risk-free bond is the only asset, the portfolio zt is a simple
random variable in Lt and the payoff functional takes the form Rt,t+1 (zt) = zt.
At every contingency, each individual is subject to a budget constraint,
(3.1) qt
(
zit
)
+ cit ≤ eit + vit,
where wealth vi in V i (the space of adapted processes in L) evolves according to
vit+1 = Rt,t+1
(
zit
)
.
An additional, solvency constraint requires that
(3.2) −git+1 ≤ Rt,t+1
(
zit
)
,
where gi in Gi is the adapted process of debt limits restricting trade in securities.
Mandatory saving is ruled out, so we assume that debt limits are positive (that
is, they belong to L+).
A solvency constraint of the form (3.2) was initially introduced by Zhang
[32] and lately adopted by Alvarez and Jermann [4]. It is an indirect portfolio
restriction: an individual may hold a portfolio implying a promise to delivery at
some future contingency; that is, Rt,t+1
(
zit
)
< 0, only if this liability does not
exceed the threshold given by debt limits. Notice that, because any portfolio with
positive payoffs is still allowed (gi lies in L+), solvency constraints do not interfere
with the traditional no arbitrage theorem and, hence, redundant securities are
priced under parity. Finally, when the risk-free bond is the only security, the
solvency constraint (3.2) takes the simpler form
−git+1 ≤ zit.
This restricts debt up to the minimum limit at future contingencies.
Beginning from any contingency in period t in T, an individual maximizes
expected discounted utility subject to budget and solvency constraints. Condi-
tional on no default, the indirect utility is denoted by J it
(
vit, g
i
)
. It depends on
the available initial wealth vit in V
i
t , inherited from the past, and on the entire
future adapted process for debt limits gi in Gi, as well as on the process of se-
curity prices q in Q. We need to ensure that, as commitment is limited, default
is never profitable.
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3.5. Not-too-tight debt limits
In line with Bulow and Rogoff [14] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22], default
entails the seizure of all assets and the loss of access to future borrowing op-
portunities. When only a risk-free bond is available, this implies that the bond
cannot be sold short anymore. When multiple securities are available, a defaulter
is allowed to form portfolios as long as they do not involve any future liabilities;
that is, obligations to deliver at some future contingencies. Thus, all insurance
contracts remain available after default provided they imply positive contingent
payoffs.10 Debt limits are set so that no debtor has an incentive to default and
no lender can profit from extending credit beyond a borrower’s debt limit.
Formally, as in Alvarez and Jermann [4] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22], debt
limits that are not too tight allow for the maximum amount of credit that is
compatible with repayment at all contingencies. This requires that, for every
individual i in I, at every t in T,
(3.3) J it
(−git, gi) = J it (0, 0) .
The left hand-side is the value of market participation, beginning with the maxi-
mum sustainable debt, whereas the right hand-side is the value of default. Indeed,
upon default, all assets are cleared (vˆit = 0) and no borrowing is permitted in
the future (gˆi = 0). Debt limits are not-too-tight if the individual is indifferent
between repayment and defaul.
3.6. Competitive equilibrium
Given the initial distribution of wealth v0 in V0, a competitive equilibrium with
self-enforcing debt consists of an allocation c in C, a price q in Q, trading plans
z in Z and debt limits g in G such that the following conditions are satisfied.
(a) For every individual i in I, given initial claims v0 in V0, the plan
(
ci, zi
)
in Ci × Zi is optimal subject to budget constraints (3.1) and solvency
constraints (3.2) at debt limits gi in Gi.
(b) Commodity and financial markets clear; that is, at every t in T,∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
eit, and
∑
i∈I
zit = 0.
10When some securities cannot be traded after default, or portfolios are further restricted
by no short sale constraints, debt is implicitly secured by the cost of restricted access to some
financial instruments, as in Pesendorfer [29]. The admission of any trade that involves no
future liabilities is more in the spirit of cash-in-advance contracts after default; that is, upfront
payments for future contingent deliveries.
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(c) For every individual i in I, debt limits gi in Gi satisfy the not-too-tight
condition (3.3).
This concept of equilibrium follows exactly Alvarez and Jermann [4], except that
the default punishment is the denial of future credit, instead of complete autarky.
When markets are complete, it coincides with the equilibrium with self-enforcing
debt studied by Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22].
4. DOMINANT ROOT
Whether debt is sustainable or not depends on long-term rates of interest
(net of growth). As proved by Bulow and Rogoff [14], when the rate of interest
is positive, default will necessarily occur at some contingency, unless debt is
rolled over. Debt would be exploding under a roll-over regime, a situation which
is inconsistent with equilibrium, because some other individual would be over-
accumulating assets and violating the necessary transversality condition. When
the rate of interest is negative, on the other side, debt would be imploding over
time, so as to disappear in the long-run. Debt is sustainable only if rates of
interest are neither persistently negative nor persistently positive in the long-
run. This clear intuition is obscured by the fact that rate of interest will be in
general varying over time and across states. Thus, to identify exact conditions,
we need to develop a simple theory of long-term rate of interest.
We introduce an elementary, though subtle, dominant root approach in or-
der to estimate the long-term rate of interest. Because markets are incomplete,
these estimates identify an upper bound and a lower bound only. Indeed, long-
term bonds are not traded and their payoffs may not be replicable by available
securities. As the pricing kernel is in general not Markovian at a competitive
equilibrium, no restriction is imposed apart from the fact that securities are
priced under no arbitrage. To avoid uninteresting situations, we also suppose
that, at every t in T, there is a portfolio z∗t in Zt such that Rt,t+1 (z∗t ) > 0 at all
contingencies. This is certainly satisfied when the risk-free bond is available.
As in the traditional no arbitrage theory, in LeRoy and Werner [27], for ex-
ample, at every t in T, we define the valuation functional Πt : Lt+1 → Lt as
Πt (bt+1) = inf
zt∈Zt
qt (zt)
subject to
bt+1 ≤ Rt,t+1 (zt) .
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This gives the minimum expenditure to meet future obligations, conditional on
available securities. Formally, this valuation defines a monotone sublinear func-
tional.11
Ideally, long-term rates of interest would be estimated by the dominant eigen-
value of the valuation operator, as in the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, and this
approach is developed in Appendix D for Markov pricing kernels with strictly
positive transitions. A general theory under our weak assumptions is not avail-
able, and we need to provide an alternative suitable method. To ensure existence,
we define dominant roots as accumulation points and this will suffice for our pur-
poses.
As dominant roots shall capture the long-term rate of interest net of the rate
of growth of the economy, we first need to consider a suitable space. Let L (e)
stand for all adapted processes that are bounded by some expansion of e in L+;
that is,
L (e) = {x ∈ L : |x| ≤ λe for some λ > 0} .
This space contains all streams of contingent payoffs that do not grow unbound-
edly relative to the aggregate endowment. The upper dominant root ρ (q) in R+
is the greatest ρ in R+ such that, for some non-zero b in L+ (e), at every t in T,
ρbt ≤ Πt (bt+1) .
Similarly, the lower dominant root γ (q) in R+ is the greatest γ in R+ such that,
for some non-zero b in L+ (e), at every t in T,
γbt ≤ −Πt (−bt+1) .
Notice that, as the valuation functional is monotone sublinear,
γ (q) ≤ ρ (q) .
11Notice that, under no arbitrage, the cost-minimizing portfolio exists; that is, there is a
portfolio zt in Zt such that
Πt (bt+1) = qt (zt)
and
bt+1 ≤ Rt,t+1 (zt) .
Indeed, remember that all σ-algebras are generated by finite partitions and, hence, the valuation
functional only involves a collection of cost-minimization programs in finitely dimensional
spaces.
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Upper and lower dominant roots are well-defined (admitting positive infinity
as a value), though we cannot in general establish the existence of their associ-
ated eigen-processes. Neither we can provide an operational criterion for their
computation under general pricing kernels. Heuristically, the upper dominant
root estimates the minimum growth rate of savings, whereas the lower dominant
root corresponds to the maximum growth rate of debt, both relative to the ag-
gregate endowment. We intuitively discuss some properties of dominant roots
and relegate a formal analysis of simple irreducible Markov pricing kernels to
Appendix D.
When only a risk-free bond is traded, dominant roots admit an elementary
characterization for simple Markov pricing kernels with strictly positive transi-
tions: they correspond, respectively, to the highest and to the lowest price of the
bond or, equivalently, to the lowest and to the highest rate of interest. When
multiple securities are traded, this link becomes less transparent: for instance,
the upper dominant root may be less than unity (ρ < 1) even though the rate
of interest is recurrently negative over time and thus the greatest price of the
risk-free bond is greater than unity. When markets are incomplete, in general,
the upper and the lower dominant root will be distinct.
Dominant roots act, in a way, as discount factors for future contingent claims.
When markets are incomplete, the present value of future claims is ambiguous,
because they cannot be replicated using available securities. The greatest val-
uation is finite when ρ < 1, whereas a finite least valuation occurs provided
that γ < 1. This bears a relevant implication for debt sustainability. Indeed,
the analysis in Bloise et al. [13] assumes an exogenously given pricing kernel
satisfying ρ < 1 and shows that debt is unsustainable. Differently, in this paper
debt is sustainable because ρ ≥ 1 at a competitive equilibrium. When γ < 1,
the least present value of the endowment is finite and this restricts the debt
capacity of an individual: any debt exceeding this natural debt limit cannot be
honored. When γ ≥ 1, instead, any arbitrary amount of debt can be repaid in
finite time. Clearly, under limited commitment, default may occur even when
debt repayment is feasible.
5. DEBT ROLL-OVER
The dominant root approach permits us to provide a better understanding
of conditions under which debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium. Un-
der complete markets, Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22] prove that self-enforcing debt
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limits necessarily allow borrowers to exactly roll over existing debt; that is, to
exactly refinance outstanding obligations by issuing new claims. In fact, equi-
librium allocations with self-enforcing private debt are equivalent to allocations
that are sustained by unbacked public debt subject to no borrowing. Repayments
are not required and private debt circulates as a speculative bubble. We show
that, under incomplete markets, this roll-over property fails, in general, when
the rate of interest is time-varying. Debt repayments are enforced by a proper
reputational mechanism, contrary to the claim of Bulow and Rogoff [14].
We consider a competitive equilibrium with non-vanishing debt.12 We say that
debt limits allow for persistent debt roll-over whenever, for some individual i in
I, there is an adapted process bi ≤ gi in the interior of L+ (e) such that bi0 = gi0
and, at every t in T,
Πt
(−bit+1) = −bit.
This condition guarantees that, beginning from the initial period, any debt level
not exceeding the threshold gi0 in L
+
0 can be perpetually refinanced by issuing
further debt subject to solvency constraints.13 Over time the individual can repay
an amount bit in L
+
t of outstanding debt by issuing additional debt up to levels
bit+1 in L
+
t+1 (see footnote 11). Furthermore, debt roll-over is persistent because
the adapted process bi belongs to the interior of L+ (e) and, hence, the amount
of debt that can be refinanced does not vanish along any path relative to the
aggregate endowment. An example clarifies our definition and the role of the
component bi in L+ (e) distinguished from debt limits gi in Gi.
Example 5.1 (Debt roll-over) Suppose that uncertainty is governed by a Markov
process on the state space S = {l, h} and that the risk-free bond is the only asset.
Also, assume that the price of the risk-free bond is constantly q = 1, irrespec-
tively of the Markov state s in S. Finally, the aggregate endowment is constant.
Debt limits are gh > 0 and gl > 0, with gh > gl. In such a situation, debt
roll-over occurs for (bl, bh) = (gl, gl). Notice that, however, the amount gh > 0
12When debt is unsecured, expectations of future deterioration of solvency conditions may
be self-fulfilling, and trade may vanish in the long-run. Debt is sustainable, but it disappears
over time, inducing no trade in the limit. We neglect competitive equilibria of this nature and
focus on those in which trade and, hence, debt occur persistently.
13The initial period is used only for narrative convenience. When debt roll-over occurs
from some other period, all our arguments apply to the equilibrium beginning from a future
contingency.
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of debt in state h in S cannot be rolled over, because solvency constraint would
be violated in a future state l in S.
Our purpose is to verify under which conditions persistent debt roll-over occurs
at a competitive equilibrium. In a stationary economy, the intuition is provided
by a simple situation in which the risk-free bond is the only security and its price
persistently fluctuates between an upper bound ρ > 0 and a lower bound γ > 0.
Along a path in which the price of the bond is constantly γ > 0, in a roll-over
regime, debt evolves according to
γbt+1 = bt.
The path would be exploding when γ < 1, and imploding when γ > 1. Neither
case is consistent with persistent debt roll-over. Hence, γ = 1. In such a condition,
any plan under no borrowing could be replicated along with the permitted debt
roll-over, because debt can always be refinanced at a non-positive rate of interest.
Supposing that ρ > 1, the cost of refinancing the debt would be occasionally
lower, yielding additional consumption with respect to the no borrowing regime,
a contradiction. Hence, ρ = 1. In other terms, persistent roll-over occurs only if
the rate of interest is constantly zero.
Proposition 5.1 (Roll-over property) Persistent debt roll-over occurs at a
competitive equilibrium only if
(5.1) ρ (q) = γ (q) = 1.
Necessary condition (5.1) reveals that persistent debt roll-over is a fragile
property. Indeed, under incomplete markets, upper and lower dominant root
will in general be distinct when the pricing kernel involves some volatility and,
so, condition (5.1) will fail. We discuss this fragility in a bounded economy subject
to aggregate uncertainty in which only a risk-free bond is traded.
Notice that, when persistent roll-over occurs at equilibrium, there is an adapted
process b in the interior of L+ (e) such that, at every t in T,
bt = qtbt+1,
where q in L+ is the price of the risk-free bond.14 For a bounded economy, this
14This property is the established condition (A.3) in the proof of Proposition 5.1.
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implies that the long-term rate of interest is zero along any path; that is,
lim
n→∞
n
√√√√n−1∏
k=0
qt+k = 1.(5.2)
Thus, debt roll-over imposes severe restrictions at a competitive equilibrium
with aggregate uncertainty: the rate of interest will require downward or upward
adjustments during phases of prosperity or recession, and this flexibility is pre-
cluded by the necessary condition (5.2). We first explain this heuristically and
then exhibit explicit conditions on primitives. These conditions are sufficient to
exclude debt roll-over at equilibrium, but far from necessary.
During phases of prosperity, individuals will have a tendency to accumulate
assets for precautionary motives, because recessions are expected in the future.
Markets will clear only if these savings are balanced by a corresponding supply
of bonds. To provide incentives to borrowing, the rate of interest will need to go
through downward adjustments and, under some conditions, will be recurrently
negative. More formally, notice that first-order conditions require, at every t in
T, that
qt ≥ max
i∈I
δEt
∇u (cit+1)
∇u (cit) .
Thus, under prudence, that is, marginal utility is weakly convex,
qt ≥ max
i∈I
δ
∇u (Etcit+1)
∇u (cit) .
When output declines with positive probability, expected consumption will neces-
sarily decrease for some individual and, when individuals are sufficiently patient,
qt ≥ max
i∈I
δ
∇u (Etcit+1)
∇u (cit) > 1.
Along a path of persistent prosperity, the rate of interest shall be recurrently
negative, which contradicts condition (5.2).
Example 5.2 (Aggregate uncertainty) To identify simple assumptions on fun-
damentals, consider an economy in which shocks to the aggregate endowment
are identically and independently distributed. And suppose that all individuals
have constant relative risk-aversion, σ > 0, over a relevant range of consumption
levels. Let
(
cis
)
i∈I in R
I
+ and
(
cisˆ
)
i∈I in R
I
+ be, respectively, the distribution of
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consumptions in current state s in S and the distribution of consumptions in
future state sˆ in S. Restriction (5.2) is necessarily violated (Claim A.1) when
(5.3)
∑
sˆ∈S
µsˆesˆ < δ
1
σ es,
where e in RS+ denotes the aggregate endowment. This condition is certainly
satisfied when individuals are sufficiently patient for an appropriate choice of
the current state. On the other hand, in order to have trade at equilibrium with
self-enforcing debt (Proposition 6.1), the sufficient condition is
(5.4) min
s∈S
max
i∈I
δ
(
eis∑
sˆ∈S µsˆe
i
sˆ
)σ
> 1.
Both restrictions (5.3) and (5.4) can be robustly fulfilled: debt is valued at equi-
librium and cannot be rolled-over.
If roll-over is infeasible, how can unsecured debt be sustained by a truly repu-
tational mechanism? Debt is used to reduce the volatility of consumption when
averse shocks occur. However, as repayment is enforced eventually, the benefit
for consumption smoothing will be exhausted at some contingency and default
will become profitable. What mechanism prevents default? As initially suggested
in Bloise et al. [13], default bears the implicit cost of reduced insurance oppor-
tunities. Upon default no further debt can be issued and future insurance will
require up-front payments or, using the terminology of Bulow and Rogoff [14],
cash-in-advance contracts. When markets are complete, repayments saved upon
default can be invested to provide resources to cover future up-front insurance
costs. This, in general, requires access to portfolios of securities with suitable
contingent payoffs. When markets are incomplete, such portfolios are only fortu-
itously available and the cost of providing insurance raises, overcoming the gain
accruing from saved debt repayment. We shall provide, later, additional intuition
in a partial equilibrium framework (§7)
6. EXISTENCE
We show that, under a suitable gains to trade hypothesis, a competitive equi-
librium with self-enforcing debt exists. Private debt is issued as an insurance
device against income fluctuations and it trustworthily circulates as the only
store of value in the economy. In general, as argued in our previous discussion
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(§5), debt is sustained by a proper reputational mechanism: default is unprof-
itable, because self-insurance is too costly, and outstanding claims are honored.
This situation is distinct from a competitive equilibrium in which outside money
is valued as a mere speculative bubble (Bewley [10, 11]), and it is more properly
associated with a form of inside money.
We provide a proof of existence when only a risk-free bond is traded in an
economy where intrinsic uncertainty is governed by a Markov process on the
finite space S with strictly positive transitions Π : S → ∆ (S). Individual endow-
ments oscillate according to this Markov process and, hence, all fundamentals are
measurable with respect to the finite Markov state space S. This, in particular,
implies that the economy cannot grow or decline over time; that is, the aggregate
endowment e in L+ is bounded. In general, at a competitive equilibrium, prices
would be affected by the distribution of wealth, as well as possibly by future
expectations, and would not be measurable with respect to the Markov state
space S. Consequently, we cannot impose any Markov restriction on the pricing
kernel.
The major difficulty in establishing existence relies on the fact that no trade
is always a competitive equilibrium. This resembles the essential property of
fiat money: when money is the only store of value and it is not valued in the
market, it will not be demanded, because it bears no intrinsic value, and no
intertemporal trade will occur; similarly, when all lenders expect that debtors
will default, they are not willing to provide credit and no intertemporal trade will
occur. We overcome this obstacle by introducing an approach that, we believe,
is novel. Namely, we construct a perturbed economy in which debt is implicitly
backed by a share of the private endowment. Trade occurs in this perturbed
economy and, as the pledgeable share of the endowment vanishes, debt becomes
purely self-enforcing. The dominant root plays an essential role in ensuring that
trade persists in the limit.
We construct an auxiliary economy in which, upon default, a fraction  in
(0, 1) of the endowment is confiscated and no further borrowing is allowed. This
is the economy E, whereas the original economy is denoted by E0. A competi-
tive equilibrium exists in the perturbed economy E.15 Debt is still unsecured,
because confiscated resources are not diverted to satisfy creditors. However, con-
15Even for the perturbed economy, we cannot rely on any established theorem in the lit-
erature, because of the self-enforcing condition. We present our analysis in Appendix C. To
establish existence, we truncate the economy by arbitrarily imposing default in the future and
progressively remove this further restriction going to the limit.
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fiscation makes default unprofitable at any level of debt that can be repaid using
a fraction  in (0, 1) of the endowment; that is, not exceeding the least present
value of confiscable resources. Indeed, why should a debtor default, and loose
a fraction of the endowment, when the debt can be repaid using this fraction?
The relevant implication is that, at any equilibrium of the perturbed economy,
the least present value of the endowment is finite, irrespectively of the share of
confiscable resources.
Lemma 6.1 (Finitely valued endowment) In any competitive equilibrium of the
perturbed economy E, there is an adapted process f  in L+ (e) such that, at every
t in T,
f t = et −Πt
(−f t+1) ,
where e in L+ is the aggregate endowment.16
As confiscable resources vanish, the equilibrium allocation cannot converge
uniformly to autarky when gains from trade are available. To identify these
situations precisely, we construct an implicit pricing at autarky by setting, at
every t in T,
q0t = max
i∈I
δEt
∇ui (eit+1)
∇ui (eit) .
The gains from trade hypothesis is that γ
(
q0
)
> 1. At a competitive equilibrium
of the perturbed economy, instead, γ (q) < 1, because the endowment would
not be finitely valued otherwise, and a reversal cannot occur under uniform
convergence. Hence, autarky cannot be an accumulation point.
In overlapping generations economies, a similar argument is used to establish
the existence of a monetary equilibrium; see Aiyagari and Peled [3] and, recently,
Barbie and Hillebrand [9]: competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient in the per-
turbed economy, whereas autarky is not; as a result, a sequence of perturbed
equilibria cannot converge to no trade uniformly. The main difference is that
monetary equilibria, as well as perturbed equilibria, are Pareto efficient in those
economies, whereas they in general fail efficiency in our economy, as well as in
the monetary economy in Bewley [10, 11]. The role of the dominant root is to
identify directions of efficiency that are achieved at a perturbed equilibrium and
16The above formula recursively computes the least present value of the aggregate endow-
ment (see Appendix D and Santos and Woodford [30, Proposition 2.2]).
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preserved in the limit. In an economy with outside assets, this issue is discussed
by Bloise and Citanna [12]. We here identify distinguished conditions when only
inside assets are traded and use them to ensure the existence of an equilibrium
with trade.
For simple Markov processes with strictly positive transitions, the gains from
trade hypothesis requires that q0t > 1 uniformly. In such a situation, a hypothet-
ical planner can improve upon autarky by means of a simple scheme of transfers:
in every period t in T, a small amount η > 0 is taken from any individual i in I
with marginal rate of substitution equal to q0t and distributed to some other indi-
vidual; in the following period, the donor is compensated with an uncontingent
transfer η > 0; expected utility increases because the compensation is valued
more at the margin; that is, q0t > 1; this chain of transfers can be continued
indefinitely. In this interpretation, the gains from trade hypothesis guarantees
a sort of time irreducibility of the economy: the transfer scheme will never be
interrupted as a potential donor will always be available. Private debt is valued
at equilibrium because it allows individuals to exploit these welfare gains. On
the contrary, in general, it will not be valued when similar welfare gains are not
available.
Lemma 6.2 (Trade in the limit) Under the gains from trade hypothesis, as  in
(0, 1) vanishes, no sequence of competitive equilibrium allocations in the perturbed
economy E can converge to autarky uniformly.
Unfortunately, this established property is not powerful enough to deliver by
itself the existence of an equilibrium with trade in the limit. Indeed, it requires
uniform convergence and, in general, sequences of perturbed equilibria may not
converge uniformly to a limit equilibrium. However, we exploit the lack of uniform
convergence to autarky to extract a sequence of perturbed equilibria (pointwise)
converging to a limit equilibrium with trade. We preliminarily verify that the
limit remains away from autarky and bounded. For given  in (0, 1), we denote
by (c, v, g) in C × V ×G a competitive equilibrium of the perturbed economy
E.
Lemma 6.3 (Bounds) Under the gains from trade hypothesis, given any se-
quence of competitive equilibria in the perturbed economy E,
(6.1) lim inf
→0
sup
t∈T
‖vt‖∞ > 0,
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and
(6.2) lim sup
→0
sup
t∈T
‖gt‖∞ <∞.
The most delicate implication of Lemma 6.2 is that borrowing does not vanish
in the limit; this is condition (6.1). Assuming not, indeed, market clearing would
require a progressive contraction of equilibrium debts and credits and, thus, a
uniform contraction of trades, contradicting Lemma 6.2. To establish that debt
limits do not explode, this is condition (6.2), we observe that an individual
would otherwise be able to afford arbitrarily large consumption for long time, by
issuing large amounts of debt, and then secure a reservation utility after default,
a situation which is inconsistent with the fact that resources are limited in the
economy and this large utility value is not feasible.
We now argue that debt is sustainable at equilibrium. In particular, we show
that an equilibrium with trade in the original economy can be approached as the
(pointwise) limit of a sequence of equilibria in the perturbed economy. A peculiar
complication arises because of the endogenous determination of debt limits that
is absent in Bewley [10, 11].17
Proposition 6.1 (Existence) Under the gains from trade hypothesis, a non-
autarkic equilibrium with self-enforcing debt exists.
The competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing debt will in general be distinct
from a Bewley [10, 11] monetary equilibrium of the same economy.18 Further-
more, when γ (q) < 1, as it happens in our examples, no speculative bubble
occurs at equilibrium with self-enforcing debt and debt is valued because of im-
plied future repayments. We add a short comment on welfare comparison.
An adaptation of our approach is suitable as an alternative method to establish
existence of a monetary equilibrium in the economy in Bewley [10, 11]. To this
17Under complete markets it is unnecessary to explicitly consider the not-too-tight condition
(3.3) for debt limits because of the equivalence established by Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22,
Theorem 1]. In sequential economies with permanent exclusion from markets upon default
(e.g., Alvarez and Jermann [4]), the existence of competitive equilibrium is proved via Welfare
Theorems and the method is not available in our economy. Neither can we use the proof in
Kehoe and Levine [23, Proposition 6], because default is there precluded by a direct restriction
of consumption plans.
18When money (an infinite-maturity asset with no intrinsic value) is traded, under conditions
which ensure its existence, our economy admits a (Bewley-type) competitive equilibrium in
which money serves as the only store of value, debt cannot be credibly issued (that is, gi = 0)
and the market for the risk-free bond remains inactive.
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purpose, the gains from trade hypothesis can be more permissive; that is, ρ
(
q0
)
>
1 as opposed to γ
(
q0
)
> 1. One way of interpreting this difference is that a
risk-free bond implements only uncontingent transfers, whereas the transfer of
resources may be contingent at a monetary equilibrium, because the real value of
money may vary across states of nature. This seems to suggest that money is a
socially superior contrivance to execute intertemporal trade. However, a welfare
comparison is ambiguous due to conflicting effects: money can only circulate as
a bubble and this enforces zero rate of interest; private debt, on the other side,
is compatible with recurrently positive rate of interest; because of impatience, a
positive rate of interest may be less distortionary and may permit more efficient
intertemporal trades, even if uncontingent.
7. MARKOV PRICING
We complement our analysis with the examination of incentives to default
in a partial equilibrium framework. The pricing kernel is fixed exogenously and
fullfils a simple Markov process.19 We provide conditions under which default
is unprofitable and, at the same time, the natural debt limit (the least present
value of future endowment) is finite. In other terms, self-enforcing debt limits
exist and do not allow for roll-over. This reveals a failure of Bulow and Rogoff [14]
when some risks are uninsurable. In addition, the simplified framework allows
for a better understanding of the implicit enforcement mechanism.
Our analysis may be of independent interest for the sovereign debt literature,
originated by Eaton and Gersovitz [18]. In the traditional framework, the pric-
ing kernel is given by the valuation of risk-neutral creditors. It has however been
noticed that risk-neutral pricing entails risk premia which are inconsistent with
empirical observations (Arellano [6, Section D]). Our approach encompasses risk-
averse creditors. This induces time variation of rate of interest and risk premium
through the sensitivity of the lender’s stochastic discount factor (the lender’s
marginal rate of substitution) along the business cycle or with respect to unin-
sured idiosyncratic risks.
Recently, Auclert and Rognlie [8] and Bloise et al. [13] showed that Bulow and
Rogoff [14] extends to incomplete markets. In Auclert and Rognlie [8], a risk-free
bond is the only asset and the pricing kernel is given by a risk-neutral lender
with constant discount factor. Under these conditions, because the price of the
risk-free bond is constant, the dominant roots coincide and are less than unity;
19We remark again that this will not in general happen at a competitive equilibrium.
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that is,
γ (q) = ρ (q) < 1.
Bloise et al. [13] study a more general framework with several securities and a
time-varying pricing kernel. Under these conditions, the dominant roots are in
general distinct; that is, γ (q) < ρ (q). They show that, when ρ (q) < 1, debt is
unsustainable, as the sovereign would profit from defaulting at some contingency,
saving on repayments and paying upfront for the same insurance contract. This
situation occurs when
γ (q) ≤ ρ (q) < 1.
We extend the analysis on default incentives further by examining the case where
γ (q) < 1 < ρ (q) .
As ρ (q) > 1, the rate of interest can be negative for long phases, self-insurance
becomes too costly and debt repayment is more convenient. As γ (q) < 1, the
natural debt limit is finite and debt is not rolled-over.20
We assume that uncertainty is described by a Markov process with strictly
positive transitions Π : S → ∆ (S) on a finite state space S. A finite set of
securities J is traded at price qs in RJ in state s in S, each delivering a payoff
Rjs,sˆ in R in state sˆ in S in the following period. Debt limits are given as g in
RS+. They are self-enforcing whenever, in every state s in S,
Js (−gs, g) = Js (0, 0) ,
where Js (vs, g) is the indirect utility in state s in S beginning with initial wealth
vs in R and subject to debt limits g in RS+ over the entire infinite horizon.
Why is debt sustainable? A comparison with complete markets helps the un-
derstanding. As argued by Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22, Theorem 1], with a com-
plete set of contingent claims, debt is sustainable only if it can be rolled-over
exactly and, as we show in Proposition 5.1, this occurs only if the dominant root
is equal to unity; that is, long-term rate of interest is zero. A corresponding con-
dition when markets are incomplete would be γ (q) = 1 and, in such a situation,
debt can be rolled-over without exploding over time, because the long-term rate
20In addition, γ (q) < 1 is a necessary condition when the pricing kernel is derived from
the lender’s expected utility with discounting, because the valuation of infinite income streams
would not be finite otherwise.
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of interest is not positive. However, exact roll over would in general require con-
tingent transfers and these are not feasible due to market incompleteness. Debt
roll-over is necessarily inexact and permits additional consumption occasionally.
Hence, this situation is more favourable than no borrowing and debt limits ad-
mitting debt roll-over are too loose. For a slight contraction of γ (q) < 1, those
debt limits remain loose, whereas natural debt limits are finite and are too tight.
As a result, limits for self-enforcing debt will exist in between limits allowing for
debt roll-over, which are too loose, and the natural debt limits, which are too
tight.
Proposition 7.1 (Sustainable debt) Non-trivial self-enforcing debt limits exist
if
γ (q) < 1 < ρ (q) ,
provided that (arbitrage-free) prices are in a sufficiently small neighbourhood
around q∗ in Q such that γ (q∗) = 1 and ρ (q∗) > 1.
We add a short comment on admitting default, as in Eaton and Gersovitz
[18] and, more recently, in Arellano [6]. For our purposes, default enhances debt
sustainability, because it increases the value of market participation for the bor-
rower. Thus, under conditions in which debt is sustainable when default is not
allowed, so will be when default can occur and the price of the bond reflects the
risk of default. In the latter case, obviously, debt is sustainable in the sense that
lenders are willing to supply credit, though anticipating default in some future
contingencies.
8. CONCLUSION
We have shown that, under incomplete markets, private debt is sustainable
by the mere reputation for repayment. The implicit enforcement mechanism
relies on a high cost of self-insurance compared with the privilege of issuing debt
when the rate of interest is low. Private debt reflects the value of expected future
repayments and, differently from Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22], does not circulate as
a speculative bubble. We interpret this as a genuine failure of the claim in Bulow
and Rogoff [14] that lending must be supported by direct sanctions available to
creditors.
We have also established the existence of a competitive equilibrium when de-
fault carries only a ban from ever borrowing in financial markets. Private debt
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is issued and traded as the only store of value so as to support risk-sharing. In
general, debt cannot be rolled over and is allocationally distinct from outside
money. Beyond ensuring existence, our strategy of proof reveals conditions for
mutually beneficial trades in a default-free bond.
A distinctive feature of self-enforcing debt under complete markets is that
debt can be exactly rolled over (Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22]). In other terms,
debt is issued by private individuals and is valued as a speculative bubble or,
according to Bulow and Rogoff [14], as a Ponzi-type reputational contract. From
an individual perspective, even if debt is rolled over, single creditors receive
repayments, as when investors sell a speculative bubble held in their portfolio and
collect the expected return as for any other security. Socially, however, private
debt is not backed by any future repayments, while, in general, it reflects its
fundamental value under incomplete markets. This has important repercussions
for the determinacy of equilibrium.
Under complete markets, at a competitive equilibrium, the amount of debt
that can be rolled over by each single individual is unrelated to fundamentals.
Indeed, any process of debt limits that allow for exact roll-over is self-enforcing
(Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22, Theorem 1]). As a result, debt privileges only derive
from an unspecified process of expectations formation and, hence, competitive
equilibrium is indeterminate: depending on expectations, an individual is allowed
to borrow more or less and this affects the effective distribution of wealth; that
is, initial financial assets, or liabilities, plus future borrowing capacity.21 When
markets are incomplete, instead, self-enforcing debt truly reflects incentives for
repayment and, so, it is intimately related to market conditions and, hence, to
fundamentals. The obvious source of indeterminacy disappears when debt cannot
be rolled over.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3.1: By individual rationality, and using Assumptions 3.1-3.2, at every t
in T,
ui
(
cit
)
+
(
δ
1− δ
)
sup
cˆi∈R+
ui
(
cˆi
) ≥ U it (ci)
≥ U it
(
ei
)
≥ U it (le)
≥
(
1
1− δ
)
ui (lη) ,
where η > 0 is the uniform lower bound for the aggregate endowment; that is, et ≥ η at every t
in T. By the Strong Inada Condition (Assumption 3.2), this suffices to prove the claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Consider any individual i in I with persistent debt roll-over and
drop the index i in I in order to simplify notation. The roll-over property immediately implies
γ (q) ≥ 1 and, hence, we show that γ (q) ≤ 1. Supposing not, there exists γ > 1 such that, for
some non-zero process bˆ in L+ (e), at every t in T,
γbˆt ≤ −Πt
(
−bˆt+1
)
.
As a consequence, we can find a portfolio process ∆z in Z such that, at every t in T,
(A.1) qt (∆zt) ≤ −γbˆt ≤ −bˆt
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and
(A.2) −bˆt+1 ≤ Rt,t+1 (∆zt) .
We now show that this portfolio process allows for super-replicating the optimal plan under
no borrowing, thus delivering a contradiction.
Define λ in R+ as the greatest value satisfying g ≥ λbˆ. Because debt limits are in the interior
of L+ (e), λ > 0 and, at no loss of generality, λ = 1. Thus, g ≥ bˆ and, at some contingency,
gt < γbˆt, since otherwise g ≥ γbˆ, a contradiction as γ > 1. At no loss of generality, to simplify
notation, assume that g0 < γbˆ0 and, so, bˆ0 > 0. We argue that
V0 (−g0, g) > V0
(
−γbˆ0, bˆ
)
≥ V0 (0, 0) ,
a contradiction. The first strict inequality is obvious, because g ≥ bˆ and −g0 > −γbˆ0. For
the other inequality, take the plan which is optimal at (0, 0) in L0 × L+ and replicate it at(
−γbˆ0, bˆ
)
in L0 × L+ by translation; that is,
zt 7→ zt + ∆zt.
By conditions (A.1)-(A.2), this is feasible, revealing a contradiction.
Clearly, ρ (q) ≥ γ (q) = 1. It only remains to verify that ρ (q) ≤ 1. The roll-over component
b in the interior of L+ (e) satisfies conditions (A.1)-(A.2) with γ = 1. If an inequality is strict
at some contingency, then the previous replication argument would imply
V0 (−g0, g) > V0 (0, 0) ,
a contradiction. This means that, at every t in T,
(A.3) bt = Πt (bt+1) = −Πt (−bt+1) .
Suppose that, given ρ in R+, there is a process bˆ in L+ (e) such that
ρbˆt ≤ Πt
(
bˆt+1
)
.
Let λ in R+ be the maximum value such that λbˆ ≤ b and, at no loss of generality, assume that
λ = 1. Monotonicity yields, at every t in T,
ρbˆt ≤ Πt
(
bˆt+1
)
≤ Πt (bt+1) ≤ bt,
so that ρ ≤ 1. This proves our claim. Q.E.D.
Claim A.1 Under condition (5.3),
qs ≥ max
i∈I
δ
(
cis∑
sˆ∈S µsˆc
i
sˆ
)σ
> 1.
Proof of Claim A.1: To obtain a contradiction, assume that, for every individual i in I,
δ
(
cis∑
sˆ∈S µsˆc
i
sˆ
)σ
≤ 1.
This implies
δ
1
σ
∑
i∈I
cis ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
sˆ∈S
µsˆc
i
sˆ ≤
∑
sˆ∈S
µsˆ
∑
i∈I
cisˆ,
thus violating condition (5.3). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 6.1: Let f i, in L+ be the maximum debt that can be re-payed, beginning
from each contingency, out of the share  in (0, 1) of the endowment. This is well-defined and
satisfies, at every t in T,
0 ≤ f i,t ≤ eit −Πt
(
−gi,t+1
)
.
The upper bound corresponds to devoting the current share of the endowment to debt repay-
ment and borrowing up to the limit. At every t in T, an individual can always repay back a
debt not exceeding f i,t in L
+
t out of share  in (0, 1) of the endowment and, at the same time,
implement the optimal plan under no borrowing with no initial wealth, so that
Ji,t
(
−f i,t , gi,
)
≥ Ji,t (0, 0) .
We claim that gi,t ≥ f i,t . Indeed, supposing not, at some contingency,
Ji,t
(
−gi,t , gi,
)
> Ji,t
(
−f i,t , gi,
)
≥ Ji,t (0, 0) ,
a contradiction. Hence, adapted process f i, in L+ satisfies, at every t in T, the recursive
condition
f i,t = e
i
t −Πt
(
−f i,t+1
)
.
This suffices to prove the claim, as ei lies in the interior of L+ (e). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.2: We assume uniform convergence to autarky and argue by contradic-
tion. At no loss of generality, the price of the bond satisfies, at every t in T,
qt = max
i∈I
δEt
∇ui
(
ci,t+1
)
∇ui
(
ci,t
) .
By the hypothesis on gains from trade, there exists γ > 1 such that, for some non-zero b0 in
L+ (e), at every t in T,
γb0t ≤ −Π0t
(−b0t+1) .
As convergence is uniform, for every sufficiently small  in (0, 1),
b0t ≤ −
1
γ
Π0t
(−b0t+1) ≤ −Πt (−b0t+1) ,
where we use the fact that q0t ≤ γqt in computing the minimum-expenditure portfolio. Let
λ > 0 be the greatest value such that λb0 ≤ f and, at no loss of generality, assume that λ = 1,
where f in the interior of L+ (e) is given in Lemma 6.1. Monotonicity implies
b0t  et −Πt
(−b0t+1) ≤ et −Πt (−ft+1) ≤ ft ,
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.3: To establish condition (6.1), we argue by contradiction. Supposing
not, lim inf→0 η = 0, where η = supt∈T ‖vt‖∞. For every individual i in I, the budget
constraint imposes, at every t in T,
vit =
(
cit − eit
)
+ qtv
i
t+1.
Furthermore, by first-order conditions,
δEt
∇ui (cit+1)
∇ui (cit) ≤ qt,
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with the equality when the individual is saving. Thus,
vit ≤
(
cit − eit
)
+ δEt
∇ui (cit+1)
∇ui (cit) vit+1.
Evaluating at a competitive equilibrium of the perturbed economy E, and using the bound on
wealth,
−η ≤
(
ci,t − eit
)
+ δEt
∇ui
(
ci,t+1
)
∇ui
(
ci,t
) η.
As the economy is bounded, by Lemma 3.1, marginal rates of substitution are uniformly
bounded, so that, for some sufficiently large κ > 0,(
ci,t − eit
)− ≤ η + κη.
By feasibility, possibly extracting a subsequence, this implies uniform convergence to autarky,
which is ruled out by Lemma 6.2. This shows that condition (6.1) holds true.
We now prove that debt limits remain bounded in the perturbed economy E, so that
condition (6.2) holds true. At no loss of generality, we can assume that, at every t in T,
qt = max
i∈I
δEt
∇ui
(
ci,t+1
)
∇ui
(
ci,t
) .
Indeed, if not, the price process can be replaced without affecting optimal consumption and
bond holding. Marginal rates of substitution are uniformly bounded because consumption is
uniformly bounded from below (by Lemma 3.1) and from above (by material feasibility). Hence,
there exist adapted processes
¯
q and q¯ in the interior of L+ (e) such that
¯
q ≤ q ≤ q¯.
Preliminarily notice that equilibrium wealth is uniformly bounded, that is,
lim sup
→0
sup
t∈T
‖vt‖∞ <∞.
In fact, as prices remain bounded, out of a large enough financial wealth, individual i in I can
afford a consumption plan ei + e¯t, where e¯t in L+ is the aggregate endowment truncated at
period t in T. By impatience, for every individual i in I,
lim
t→∞U
i
0
(
ei + e¯t
)
> U i0 (e¯) ≥ U i0
(
ci,
)
.
Thus, if equilibrium wealth is unbounded, some individual would be able to afford an unfeasibly
large value in utility, a contradiction.
Suppose that, by an appropriate choice of the initial state s in S, there is a sequence of
equilibria in the perturbed economy E such that, for some individual i in I, lim→0 gi,0 =∞.
Notice that debt limits satisfy, at every t in T,
gi,t ≤ eit −Πt
(
−gi,t+1
)
≤ eit − Π¯t
(
−gi,t+1
)
,
because otherwise the budget set would be empty. The bound in the extreme right hand-side
is computed using the pricing functional Π¯t : Lt+1 → Lt corresponding to the upper bound
on the price process for the risk-free bond. It follows that debt limits diverge at every t in T.
Possibly extracting a subsequence, it can be assumed that the sequence of consumption plans(
ci,
)
>0
in Ci converges to a consumption plan ci in Ci. Let cˆi in Ci be cit + et up to period
tˆ in T and (1− ˆ) eit at any other following period t in T, where ˆ lies in (0, 1). By impatience,
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period tˆ in T can be chosen sufficiently large so that U i0
(
cˆi
)
> U i0
(
ci,
)
for every sufficiently
small  in (0, ˆ). Let vˆi, in L be a financial plan supporting cˆi in Ci, from bounded initial
wealth vi,0 in L0, ignoring solvency constraints; that is, such that, at every t in T,
qt vˆ
i,
t+1 + cˆ
i
t = e
i
t + vˆ
i,
t .
When the individual defaults in period tˆ+1 in T, she can secure a level of utility at least equal
to U i
tˆ+1
(
(1− ˆ) ei). Thus, we only need to verify that vˆi,t+1 ≥ −gi,t+1 up to period tˆ in T. This
is certainly satisfied as debt limits diverge and the financial plan remains bounded on the finite
horizon, thus yielding a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.1: Given a perturbation  in (0, 1), we denote (c, v, g) in C ×
V × G a competitive equilibrium of the perturbed economy E. At no loss of generality, the
price of the bond is determined, at every t in T, by
qt = max
i∈I
δEt
∇ui
(
ci,t+1
)
∇ui
(
ci,t
) .
By choosing the initial state s in S appropriately, we can extract a sequence of equilibrium
plans (c, v, g)>0 in C × V ×G (pointwise) converging to plans (c, v, g) in C × V ×G such
that ‖v0‖∞ > 0. We need to verify that plans are optimal and debt limits are self-enforcing. We
then establish that the limit equilibrium necessarily implies trade beginning from any initial
state s in S.
We first show that, at every t in T, lim→0 Ji,t (0, 0) = Jit (0, 0) and, just to simplify notation,
we assume that t = 0. To this purpose, consider the (otherwise indentical) program truncated
at tˆ in T. Notice that, as this is basically a maximizaton program over a finite horizon, by
canonical arguments,
lim
→0
∣∣∣Ji,tˆ0 (0, 0)− Ji,,tˆ0 (0, 0)∣∣∣ = 0.
Any budget feasible plan in the untrucated program can be replicated in the truncated program
over the truncated finite horizon. Thus, as continuation utility is bounded from above by some
sufficiently large ∆∗ > 0 (because utility is bounded from above) and from below by some
sufficiently small ∆∗ < 0 (because a fraction of the endowment can be consumed), we obtain,
for every sufficiently small  in (0, 1),∣∣∣Ji,0 (0, 0)− Ji,,tˆ0 (0, 0)∣∣∣ ≤ δtˆ+1 (∆∗ −∆∗)
and ∣∣∣Ji0 (0, 0)− Ji,tˆ0 (0, 0)∣∣∣ ≤ δtˆ+1 (∆∗ −∆∗) .
By a conventional triangular decomposition, this suffices to prove our claim. Similarly, we
establish that, at every t in T, lim→0 Ji,t
(
−gi,t , gi,
)
= Jit
(−git, gi).
Clearly, the plan in the limit satisfies budget and solvency constraints. Supposing that it
is not optimal, for all sufficiently small  in (0, 1), Ji0
(
vi0, g
i
)
> Ji,0
(
vi,0 , g
i,
)
+ ∆ for some
∆ > 0. As a consequence, for any truncation tˆ in T,
Ji,tˆ0
(
vi0, g
i
)
+ δtˆ+1∆∗ ≥
Ji0
(
vi0, g
i
)
> Ji,0
(
vi,0 , g
i,
)
+ ∆
≥ Ji,,tˆ0
(
vi,0 , g
i,
)
+ δtˆ+1∆∗ + ∆,
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where the upper bound ∆∗ > 0 and the lower bound ∆∗ are given as in the previous step.
For a sufficiently large tˆ in T, this implies that Ji,tˆ0
(
vi0, g
i
)
> Ji,,tˆ0
(
vi,0 , g
i,
)
+ ∆ for every
sufficiently small  in (0, 1), thus delivering a contradiction because the value of the truncated
program varies continuously.
We finally verify that there is a limit equilibrium involving trade from any initial state s in
S. Indeed, supposing that trade always vanishes in the continuation economy whenever a state
s in S is reached, no wealth is transferred to this state and, so, because transition probabilities
are strictly positive and only a risk-free bond is traded, to any state; that is, vt+1 = 0 for every
t in T. Hence, the initial allocation itself is autarkic, contradicting the fact that the limit is
selected so that ‖v0‖∞ > 0. As a result, a non-autarkic equilibrium exists beginning from any
state s in S. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7.1: We preliminarily consider the limit case when γ (q∗) = 1 and
ρ (q∗) > 1. To this purpose, let
¯
g in RS+ be the lower dominant eigenvector (see Claim D.4).
For every s in S, there exists a portfolio ∆zs in RJ such that
q∗s (−∆zs) ≤ −
¯
gs
and, at every sˆ in S,
−
¯
gsˆ ≤ Rs,sˆ (−∆zs) .
Moreover, since the eigenvector is not in the market span (because γ (q∗) < ρ (q∗)), the last
inequality is strict in at least one state sˆ in S. We shall show that, for every state s in S,
(A.4) J∗s
(−
¯
gs,
¯
g
)
> J∗s (0, 0) ,
where the value function is evaluated at prices q∗ in Q.
Let Ss be the space of all partial histories beginning from state s in S, and let s (σ) be the
state in S occurring at the end of partial history σ in Ss; that is, σ = (s0, s1, . . . , st−1, st) in
St+1 with s0 = s and st = s (σ). The optimal plan under no borrowing and no initial wealth
satisfies, at every σ in Ss,
q∗s(σ) (zσ) +
(
cσ − es(σ)
) ≤ wσ
and, at every continuation history σˆ = (σ, sˆ) in Ss,
0 ≤ wσˆ = Rs(σ),s(σˆ) (zσ) .
Adding the above identified portfolio,
q∗s(σ)
(
zσ −∆zs(σ)
)
+
(
cσ − es(σ)
) ≤ wσ −
¯
gs(σ)
and, at every continuation history σˆ in Ss,
−
¯
gs(σˆ) ≤ wσˆ −
¯
gs(σˆ) ≤ Rs(σ),s(σˆ)
(
zσ −∆zs(σ)
)
.
The last inequality is strict for at least some continuation history σˆ in Ss. By strict monotonicity
of preferences, this proves the claim.
We now show that condition (A.4) continues to hold true after a perturbation of prices such
that γ (q) < 1 < ρ (q). Provided this perturbation is sufficiently small, by Claim D.6, there
exists a minimum consumption
¯
c in RS++ such that, at every s in S,
¯
gs ≤ (es −
¯
cs)−Πs
(−
¯
g
)
.
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The existence of a budget-feasible minimum consumption avoids complications related to un-
bounded utility. Consider the Bellman operator defined, at every s in S, by
(TJ)s (vs, q) = supu (cs) + δ
∑
sˆ∈S
µs,sˆJsˆ
(
Rs,sˆ (zs) , q
)
subject to
qs (zs) + (cs − es) ≤ vs
and, at every sˆ in S,
−
¯
gs ≤ Rs,sˆ (zs) .
This operator T : J → J acts on the space of all bounded maps J : D → R, where D contains
all v ≥ −
¯
g in RS+ and all arbitrage-free prices in a open neighborhood of q∗ in Q. The operator
is a contraction (by Blackwell discounting) and, hence, admits a unique fixed point. Consider
the feasible correspondence F : D  R+ × RJ . This correspondence is continuous with non-
empty compact values. By Berge’s Maximum Theorem, when J in J is continuous, so it (TJ)
in J . Hence, the unique fixed point is continuous, which proves the validity of condition (A.4)
for any slight perturbation of (arbitrage-free) prices such that γ (q) < 1 < ρ (q).
As long as γ (q) < 1, natural debt limits g¯ in RS++ are finite (see Claim D.3) and, at no loss
of generality,
¯
g ≤ g¯, because they grow unboundedly as γ (q) approaches γ (q∗) = 1. Define the
mapping f :
[
¯
g, g¯
]→ [
¯
g, g¯
]
by the formula
Js (−fs (g) , g) = Js (0, 0) .
The unique solution exists because, by Inada condition,
Js (−g¯s, g) < Js (0, 0)
and, by the previous characterization,
Js
(−
¯
gs, g
) ≥ Js (−
¯
gs,
¯
g
)
> Js (0, 0) .
Notice that mapping f :
[
¯
g, g¯
] → [
¯
g, g¯
]
is monotone. We claim that self-enforcing debt limits
g in
[
¯
g, g¯
]
are determined, at every s in S, by
gs = lim
n→∞ f
n
s
(
¯
g
)
.
Preliminarily observe that, by canonical arguments, at every s in S,
Js (−gs, g) ≥ Js (0, 0) .
Fix any t in T and let Jt be the value function corresponding to the truncated program at t
in T. As this is a finite-dimensional program, by continuity,
Jts (−gs, g) = limn→∞ J
t
s
(−fn+1s (
¯
g
)
, fn
(
¯
g
))
.
Notice that, after the truncation, the no borrowing value can be secured, because, at every s
in S,
Js
(−fns (
¯
g
)
, fn
(
¯
g
)) ≥ Js (−fn+1s (
¯
g
)
, fn
(
¯
g
))
= Js (0, 0) .
Therefore, as continuation utility is bounded from above and from below, there exists ∆ > 0
such that ∣∣Jts (−fn+1s (
¯
g
)
, fn
(
¯
g
))− Js (−fn+1s (
¯
g
)
, fn
(
¯
g
))∣∣ ≤ δt+1∆
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and ∣∣Jts (−gs, g)− Js (−gs, g)∣∣ ≤ δt+1∆.
This suffices to prove that, at every s in S,
Js (−gs, g) = lim
n→∞ Js
(−fn+1s (
¯
g
)
, fn
(
¯
g
))
= Js (0, 0) ,
thus establishing the claim. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE
We provide a simple example of competitive equilibrium with no debt roll-over. In particu-
lar, to preserve stationarity, we assume constant marginal utilities and set prices so that one
individual is indifferent in each period. The example is non-robust because of this feature. The
equilibrium would in general not be stationary for a perturbation of relevant parameters.
The economy consists of two individuals with cyclic endowment. When the endowment of
an individual is low,
¯
e, the endowment of the other individual is high, e¯, with e¯ >
¯
e > 0.22
In addition, an independent and identically distributed shock s in S = {u, d} affects marginal
utility. In particular, when income is low, marginal utility is unitary; when income is high, it
is either ψu or ψd with equal probability, where
(B.1) 1 ≥ ψu > ψd > 0.
The only asset is a discount risk-free bond. In order to ensure trade, we set prices so that the
high-endowment individual is indifferent between saving and dissaving. In particular, letting δ
in (0, 1) be the common discount factor, the price of the bond, depending on state s in S, is
(B.2) qs =
δ
ψs
.
To guarantee that the low-endowment individual is willing to borrow, we assume that
(B.3) min
s∈S
qs >
δ
2
∑
s∈S
ψs.
Under the stated conditions, we characterize the value function explicitly.
Borrowing is allowed up to debt limits g =
(
g¯,
¯
g
)
in RS+ × RS+, where g¯s and
¯
gs are the
maximum sustainable debt, depending on endowment, in state s in S. Such debt limits are
consistent; that is,
g¯s ≤ e¯+ qs min
s∈S ¯
gs
and
¯
gs ≤
¯
e+ qs min
s∈S
g¯s.
Indeed, if not, the maximum debt would not be sustainable beginning from one of the states
in S. Each individual is subject to a budget constraint
qsv
′ + c ≤ e+ v,
22Because marginal utilities are constant, high and low endowment play no role and are
used only for narrative convenience. We assume that the endowment is sufficiently large so as
to ensure positive consumption in all states.
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whereas the holding of the risk-free bond is restricted by the solvency constraint
−min
s∈S
g′s ≤ v′,
where g′ in RS+ is the maximum sustainable debt in the following period. By pricing restrictions
(B.2)-(B.3), the individual will be borrowing only when income is high in the next period. As
a consequence, the only relevant limit is
d = min
s∈S
g¯s.
Claim B.1 (Value function under borrowing) The value function is, when income is low,
¯
Js (v) =
¯
e+ v + qsd+
1
2
δ
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
ψs (e¯− d) + 1
2
δ2
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
(
¯
e+ qsd)
and, when income is high,
J¯s (v) = ψs (e¯+ v) +
1
2
δ
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
(
¯
e+ qsd) +
1
2
δ2
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
ψs (e¯− d) .
Proof: When income is low, the maximization program is
max
¯
e+ v − qsv′ + δ
2
∑
s∈S
J¯s
(
v′
)
subject to
¯
e+ v
qs
≥ v′ ≥ −min
s∈S
g¯s.
This is equivalent to
max
−qs + δ
2
∑
s∈S
ψs
 v′.
Because of condition (B.3), the only solution is v′ = −mins∈S g¯s. Hence,
¯
Js (v) =
¯
e+ v + qsd+
δ
2
∑
s∈S
J¯s (−d)
=
¯
e+ v + qsd+
1
2
δ
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
ψs (e¯− d) + 1
2
δ2
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
(
¯
e+ qsd) ,
which is exactly the formula in the claim.
To verify the equation for high income, consider the maximization program
maxψs
(
e¯+ v − qsv′
)
+
δ
2
∑
s∈S ¯
Js
(
v′
)
subject to
e¯+ v
qs
≥ v′ ≥ −min
s∈S ¯
gs.
This is equivalent to
max (−ψsqs + δ) v′,
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which is consistent with v′ = (e¯+ v) /qs because of the pricing rule (B.2). Hence,
J¯s (v) =
δ
2
∑
s∈S ¯
Js
(
e¯+ v
qs
)
= δ
(
e¯+ v
qs
)
+
1
2
δ
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
(
¯
e+ qsd) +
1
2
δ2
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
ψs (e¯− d)
= ψs (e¯+ v) +
1
2
δ
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
(
¯
e+ qsd) +
1
2
δ2
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
ψs (e¯− d) ,
so proving the claim. Q.E.D.
To determine debt limits, we now impose the not-too-tight condition; that is,
Js (−gs) = J0s (0) ,
where J0 is the value function under no borrowing (that is, when g = 0). Notice that[
J¯d (−d)− J¯0d (0)
]− [J¯u (−d)− J¯0u (0)] = (ψu − ψd) d.
Therefore, because of (B.1), the debt limit will be binding in state u in S; that is, d = g¯u < g¯d.
The not-too-tight condition is thus
(B.4) J¯u (−d) = J¯0u (0) .
We now show that this condition admits a non-trivial solution for some specification of param-
eters.
Claim B.2 (Debt limit) When ψu = 1, there exists ψd in (0, δ) such that the not-too-tight
condition (B.4) is solved by any sufficiently small d > 0.
Proof: By identification, condition (B.4) is satisfied if and only if
ψud = δ
1
2
1
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
qs − 1
2
δ
1− δ2
∑
s∈S
ψs
 d.
Assuming that ψu = 1 (and so that qu = δ by condition (B.2)), the above equation becomes
f (ψd) = δ
(
1
1− δ2
qd + δ
2
− δ
1− δ2
1 + ψd
2
)
= 1.
When ψd = δ, then qd = 1 and
f (δ) = δ
(
1
1− δ2
1 + δ
2
− δ
1− δ2
1 + δ
2
)
= δ
1− δ
1− δ2
1 + δ
2
=
δ
2
.
When ψd → 0, then qd →∞ and
lim
ψd→0
f (ψd) =∞.
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, a solution exists in (0, δ). Q.E.D.
In the competitive equilibrium, the individual borrows up to d > 0 when income is low
and saves up to d > 0 when income is high. This plan is optimal because the high income
individual is exactly indifferent, whereas the low-income individual is constrained. Furthermore,
it satisfies market clearing. A distinguished feature of this competitive equilibirium is that debt
is sustainable. However, differently from Hellwig and Lorenzoni [22], debt cannot be rolled over.
Indeed, notice that rate of interest is strictly positive in state u in S (i.e., qu = δ). Hence, when
debt is refinanced along a sequence of persistent shocks u in S, its value grows unboundedly and
default is eventually profitable. To enforce repayment, debt limits have to preclude roll-over.
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APPENDIX C: PERTURBED EQUILIBRIUM
C.1. Preliminaries
We here prove the existence of an equilibrium in the perturbed economy E for a given  in
(0, 1). As some parts of the proof are rather involved, we only sketch conventional steps and
expand those that require more innovative arguments. In order to simplify notation, we drop
any explicit reference to the given  in (0, 1). To establish existence, we artificially force no
borrowing out of a finite horizon and progressively relax this additional constraint by taking
the limit.
Using Lemma 3.1, by material feasibility and individually rationality, consumption plans
are bounded from above by ¯ > 0 and from below by
¯
 > 0. We fix a lower bound
¯
q and a
upper bound q¯ in L+ on prices such that
(C.1) 0 <
¯
qt < min
i∈I
δ
∇ui (¯)
∇ui (
¯
)
≤ max
i∈I
δ
∇ui (
¯
)
∇ui (¯) < q¯t.
Both upper bound and lower bound are taken as constant processes. The auctioneer will vary
prices in the truncated interval Q =
[¯
q, q¯
] ⊂ L+.
We assume that, for every individual i in I, vi0 = 0. We truncate the economy at some
s in T and assume that a fraction  in (0, 1) of the endowment is confiscated and that no
borrowing is allowed after this period. On the finite horizon Ts = {0, 1, 2, . . . , s}, instead,
borrowing is permitted. We shall then take the limit over truncations in the next step of the
proof. Remember that, with a single safe bond, vit+1 = z
i
t at every t in T.
C.2. Optimal plans
Given a price q in the interval Q, beginning from every contingency in period t in T, we
compute the indirect utility J¯it (q) subject to no borrowing, and no initial wealth, when a
fraction  in (0, 1) of the endowment is expropriated. This indirect utility varies continuously
with respect to prices q in the interval Q.
For fixed s in T, we also consider a truncated program where borrowing is allowed, subject
to participation, only on the finite horizon Ts = {0, . . . , s}. In this truncated program, the
endowment ei,s in L+ coincides with ei in L+ up to period s in T and with the unconfiscated
fraction (1− ) ei in L+ after period s in T. At every t in T, the individual is subject to
participation constraint
U it
(
ci
) ≥ J¯it (q) .
Furthermore, the holding of the bond is restricted, at every t in (T/Ts), by the no borrowing
constraint
vit ≥ 0.
Thanks to the truncation, conventional arguments show that the optimal plan varies continu-
ously with prices, because the participation constraint is effective only over the finite horizon
Ts.
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C.3. Adjustment process
On the domain Q =
[¯
q, q¯
]
, we construct a correspondence F : Q Q by means of the rule
Ft (q) = argmaxq˜∈Q q˜t
∑
i∈I
zit (q) .
This correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with convex values on a compact domain and,
thus, it admits a fixed point. We next argue by induction and prove that, at a fixed point,∑
i∈I v
i
t ≤ 0 for every t in T.
Suppose that
∑
i∈I v
i
t ≤ 0 and
∑
i∈I z
i
t > 0. This implies qt = q¯t. For some individual i
in I such that zit > 0, as participation constraint is not binding in the following period when
wealth is positive, first-order conditions imply
q¯t ≤ δEt
∇ui (cit+1)
∇ui (cit) .
Because cit ≤ ¯ by material feasibility (indeed, as
∑
i∈I v
i
t ≤ 0 and
∑
i∈I z
i
t > 0, material
feasibility follows by adding up budget constraints) and cit+1 ≥ ¯ by individual rationality, this
violates condition (C.1). Hence,
∑
i∈I z
i
t ≤ 0 and, thus,
∑
i∈I v
i
t+1 ≤ 0.
No borrowing after period s in T implies that
∑
i∈I v
i
t = 0 for all t in (T/Ts). To com-
plete the proof, we proceed by backward induction. Supposing that
∑
i∈I z
i
t+1 = 0, we obtain
that cit+1 ≤ ¯ by material feasibility (because
∑
i∈I v
i
t+1 ≤ 0). Furthermore, assuming that∑
i∈I z
i
t < 0, then qt =
¯
qt. By first-oder conditions, along with material feasibility and indi-
vidual rationality,
¯
qt ≥ δEt
∇ui (cit+1)
∇ui (cit) ≥ δEt∇u
i (¯)
∇ui (
¯
)
.
This contradicts the lower bound given by (C.1).
C.4. Relaxing truncation
We now take the limit by relaxing the truncation s in T. Previous steps show the existence
of a truncated equilibrium prices qs in Q, with an associated optimal consumption plan ci,s
in L+ for every individual i in I. For fixed s in T, given any contingency in period t in T, we
compute the indirect utility Ji,st
(
vit
)
subject to budget constraints, participation constraints
and no borrowing after period s in T when initial wealth is vit in Lt. By convention, the value
is negative infinity when constraints cannot be satisfied. For every t in T, we determine gi,st in
L+t as
(C.2) Ji,st
(
−gi,st
)
= J¯it ,
where the right hand-side is the indirect utility subject to no borrowing, and no initial wealth,
when the fraction  in (0, 1) of the endowment is confiscated. A solution exists by continuity,
as the participation constraint cannot be satisfied when the initial debt is too large and no
borrowing is permitted eventually. Also notice that gi,st = 0 for every t in (T/Ts). The plan
remains optimal when participation constraints are substituted by solvency constraints of the
form
vit ≥ −gi,st .
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Thus, for the last steps, we only maintain not-too-tight solvency constraints (i.e., satisfying
condition (C.2)) and consider the limit with respect to s in T.
Debt limits remain bounded. If not, it would be budget feasible to borrow for a large finite
horizon, consuming large amount of resources, and then to revert to the plan ensuring reserva-
tion utility (see the last part of the proof of Lemma 6.3 for a similar argument). Hence, possible
extracting a subsequence, consumption plans, financial plans and debt limits converge.
C.5. Limit
As budget feasibility is satisfied in the limit, we argue by contradiction to show that the
limit plan ci in L+ is optimal subject to budget and solvency constraints. Supposing not, there
exists an alternative budget feasible plan cˆi in L+, with an associated trading plan zˆi in Zi,
yielding higher utility. By slightly contracting initial consumption and spreading this value
over time by saving a fraction and freely disposing of the rest over time, we can assume that
budget and solvency constraints are never binding. By discounting, for some sufficiently large
tˆ in T, we have
U i0
(
cˆi
)
+ δtˆ+1E0
(
U i
tˆ+1
(
(1− ) ei)− U i
tˆ+1
(
cˆi
))
> U i0
(
ci
)
,
where ci in L+ is the dominated plan in the limit. For any sufficiently large s in T, the con-
sumption plan cˆi in L+ and the financial plan vˆi in L satisfy budget and solvency constraint
at every t in Ttˆ =
{
0, . . . , tˆ
}
, because budget and solvency constraints are not binding. Fur-
thermore, vˆi
tˆ+1
in Ltˆ+1 satisfies vˆ
i
tˆ+1
≥ −gi,s
tˆ+1
. Hence, individual i in I can implement this
given plan on Ttˆ and the optimal plan starting from wealth vˆitˆ+1 in Ltˆ+1 on
(
T/Ttˆ
)
, so as to
secure the utility value given by
U i0
(
cˆi
)
+ δtˆ+1E0
(
Ji,s
tˆ+1
(
vˆi
tˆ+1
)
− U i
tˆ+1
(
cˆi
)) ≥
U i0
(
cˆi
)
+ δtˆ+1E0
(
Ji,s
tˆ+1
(
−gi,s
tˆ+1
)
− U i
tˆ+1
(
cˆi
)) ≥
U i0
(
cˆi
)
+ δtˆ+1E0
(
U i
tˆ+1
(
(1− ) ei)− U i
tˆ+1
(
cˆi
))
> U i0
(
ci
)
,
where we use the fact that the unconfiscated part of the endowment can be consumed. This
shows that, for all sufficiently large s in T, a utility greater than U i,s0
(
ci,s
)
is budget-affordable,
a contradiction.
APPENDIX D: DOMINANT ROOT
We provide a self-contained presentation of the dominant root method for simple Markov
pricing kernels under incomplete markets. We begin with the study of an abstract operator
and relate our findings to the asset pricing kernel. Our analysis integrates and expands Bloise
et al. [13, Appendix C].
We consider a continuous operator Π : V → V on some Euclidean linear space V , endowed
with its canonical norm and its canonical ordering. The operator is monotone; that is, v′ ≥ v′′
implies Π (v′) ≥ Π (v′′). It is also sublinear; that is, Π (λv) = λΠ (v), for every λ in R+, and
Π (v′ + v′′) ≤ Π (v′) + Π (v′′). In addition, it satisfies the property
(D.1) v > 0 implies Π (v) 0.
As usual, V+ is the positive cone of the linear space V . Monotone sublinearity is the property
inherited by the pricing kernel, under no arbitrage, when markets are incomplete. Condition
(D.1) obtains under strictly positive Markov transitions.
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Dominant roots are defined as in our analysis in §4. The upper dominant root ρ (Π) is given
by the greatest ρ in R+ such that, for some non-zero b in V+,
ρb ≤ Π (b) .
Analogously, the lower dominant root γ (Π) is given by the greatest γ in R+ such that, for
some non-zero b in V+,
γb ≤ −Π (−b) .
The upper and the lower dominant roots capture the maximum expansion rate of the operator
on the positive and on the negative cone, respectively. A simple argument establishes existence
of dominant roots.
Claim D.1 (Dominant roots) Both ρ (Π) and γ (Π) exist and satisfy
γ (Π) ≤ ρ (Π) .
Proof: Let ∆ be the unitary simplex in V+ and consider the map F : ∆ R+ defined by
F (d) = {ρ ∈ R+ : ρd ≤ Π (d)} .
This is upper hemicontinuous with compact values. By the Maximum Theorem, the value
function f (d) = maxρ∈F (d) ρ is upper semicontinuous. Its maximum ρ (Π) = maxd∈∆ f (d) is
the upper dominant root. A similar argument establishes the existence of the lower dominant
root. By sublinearity,
−Π (−b) ≤ Π (b) ,
which shows that γ (Π) ≤ ρ (Π). Q.E.D.
We also show that dominant roots are uniquely identified when eigenvectors exist.
Claim D.2 (Identification) If there is b in the interior of V+ such that, for some ρ in R+,
ρb = Π (b) ,
then ρ (Π) = ρ. Analogously, if there is b in the interior of V+ such that, for some γ in R+,
γb = −Π (−b) ,
then γ (Π) = γ.
Proof: As the other proof is specular, to verify the second statement, consider any non-zero
b∗ in V+ such that
γ (Π) b∗ ≤ −Π (−b∗) .
Let λ in R+ be the maximum value such that λb∗ ≤ b and, at no loss of generality, assume
that λ = 1. Monotonicity yields
γ (Π) b∗ ≤ −Π (−b∗) ≤ −Π (−b) ≤ γb,
which implies γ (Π) ≤ γ. As γ ≤ γ (Π) by the definition of lower dominant root, the claim is
proved. Q.E.D.
44
We relate dominant roots to the existence of well-defined present values. Fixing a (recursive)
claim e in V+, the upper present value is the solution to recursive equation
(D.2) f = e+ Π (f) .
Analogously, the lower present value is the solution to recursive equation
(D.3) f = e−Π (−f) .
We show that present values are finite if and only if dominant roots are less than unity.
Claim D.3 (Present values) Given a claim e in the interior of V+, the upper (lower) present
value is finite if and only if ρ (Π) < 1 (γ (Π) < 1).
Proof: We show the claim for the lower present value, as the argument is analogous in the
other case. Suppose that γ (Π) ≥ 1 and that f in the interior of V+ solves equation (D.3). Let
λ be the greatest value in R+ such that λb ≤ f , where γ (Π) b ≤ −Π (−b) and b is a non-zero
element of V+. Monotone sublinearity implies
λb e− λΠ (−b) ≤ e−Π (−λb) ≤ e−Π (−f) ≤ f,
a contradiction. Now assume that γ (Π) < 1 and define, beginning with f0 = 0, for every n in
Z+,
fn+1 = e−Π (−fn) .
Clearly, fn+1 ≥ fn. If this sequence converges, we obtain the lower present value by continuity.
Otherwise, it diverges and, by linear homogeneity,
fn
‖fn‖ ≤
fn+1
‖fn‖ =
e
‖fn‖ −Π
(
− f
n
‖fn‖
)
.
Possibly extracting a converging subsequence, in the limit, for some non-zero b in V+,
b ≤ −Π (−b) ,
which implies γ (Π) ≥ 1, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We are now in the condition of proving existence of dominant eigenvectors. Notice that we
do not show that the lower eigenvector lies in the interior of V+, as instead required for the
identification.
Claim D.4 (Dominant eigenvectors) There exists b in the interior of V+ such that
(D.4) ρ (Π) b = Π (b) .
Furthermore, there exists a non-zero b in V+ such that
(D.5) γ (Π) b = −Π (−b) .
Proof: The existence of an eigenvector satisfying (D.4) is proved in Bloise et al. [13, Propo-
sition C.1]. To establish the existence of the lower eigenvector, given any  in (0, 1), consider
the perturbed operator
Π =
(
1− 
γ (Π)
)
Π.
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Notice that, by linear homogeneity, γ (Π) = 1 − . Fix a claim e in the interior of V+ and
observe that the lower present value f in the interior of V+ exists for the perturbed operator
(Claim D.3). Observe that b = f/ ‖f‖ is in V+, with ‖b‖ = 1, and
b =
e
‖f‖ −
(
1− 
γ (Π)
)
Π (−b) .
Going to the limit as  in (0, 1) vanishes, possibly extracting a subsequence, we obtain the
claim because the lower present value grows unboundedly and, hence,
γ (Π) b = −Π (−b) ,
thus concluding the proof. Q.E.D.
We apply our general analysis to a Markov pricing kernel under incomplete markets. To this
purpose, we assume that uncertainty is generated by a Markov process on the finite state space
S, with µs,sˆ > 0 being the probability of moving from state s in S into state sˆ in S. A finite
set of securities J is traded at price qs in RJ in state s in S, each delivering a payoff Rjs,sˆ in
R in state sˆ in S in the following period. In state s in S, a portfolio zs in RJ can be acquired
at market price
qs (zs) =
∑
j∈J
qjsz
j
s ,
yielding a contingent payoff in the following period according to
Rs (zs) =
∑
j∈J
Rjs,sˆz
j
s

sˆ∈S
∈ RS .
We assume the absence of arbitrage opportunities; that is, Rs (zs) > 0 only if qs (zs) > 0. Fur-
thermore, we suppose that securities allows for a strictly positive transfer; that is, Rs
(
zfs
)
 0
for some portfolio zfs in RJ . When this fails, the current state is disconnected from some future
state.
We consider the conventional valuation operator generated by the minimum expenditure
program; that is,
(D.6) Πs (v) = min
zs∈RJ
qs (zs)
subject to
v ≤ Rs (zs) .
The specular operation is given by
(D.7) −Πs (−v) = max
zs∈RJ
qs (zs)
subject to
Rs (zs) ≤ v.
Under the stated assumptions, operator Π : RS → RS is continuous, monotone and sublinear
(see LeRoy and Werner [27, Chapter 4]). In particular, the cost-minimizing portfolio exists
under no arbitrage. We remark that condition (D.1) obtains because all Markov transitions are
strictly positive. Given an arbitrage price q in RJ×S , we denote ρ (q) and γ (q) the dominant
roots of the pricing operator Π : RS → RS .
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We compute dominant roots in the relevant case when only the risk-free (discount) bond is
traded: the upper dominant root is the greatest price of the bond, whereas the lower dominant
root is the least price of the bond. Hence, in such a situation, the upper (lower) dominant root
is less than unity if and only if the rate of interest is always (sometimes) strictly positive.
Claim D.5 (Safe bond only) When the risk-free bond is the only asset,
ρ (q) = max
s∈S
qs and γ (q) = min
s∈S
qs.
Proof: By no arbitrage, q lies in RS++. By direct inspection, let b in RS++ be given by bs = qs
at every s in S. To satisfy the constraint in (D.6), it is necessary to hold at least a quantity
maxsˆ∈S qsˆ of the risk-free bond (with unitary payoff). Thus,
Πs (b) =
(
max
sˆ∈S
qsˆ
)
qs =
(
max
sˆ∈S
qsˆ
)
bs = ρ (q) bs.
Similarly, to satisfy the reverse constraint in (D.7), it is necessary to hold no more than quantity
minsˆ∈S qsˆ of the risk-free bond. Thus,
−Πs (−b) =
(
min
sˆ∈S
qsˆ
)
qs =
(
min
sˆ∈S
qsˆ
)
bs = γ (q) bs.
It may well be true that the upper dominant root is larger than unity, ρ (q) > 1, because the
rate of interest is negative, qs > 1, in some state s in S. Q.E.D.
To conclude, we show continuity of valuation as asset prices vary.
Claim D.6 (Continuity) For given b in RS , at every s in S, the minimum-cost Πs (b, q) is
continuous in (arbitrage-free) security prices q in RJ×S .
Proof: Pick a sequence of prices (qn)n∈N in RJ×S converging to q in RJ×S . Letting zs in
RJ be a minimum-cost portfolio in the limit, we have
Πns (b)−Πs (b) ≤ qns (zs)− qs (zs) .
It follows that
lim sup
n→∞
Πns (b) ≤ Πs (b) .
In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that
lim inf
n→∞ Π
n
s (b) < Πs (b) .
As the sequence (Πns (b))n∈N in R is bounded, we can assume that it converges at no loss of
generality. Letting zns in RJ be a minimum-cost portfolio at n in N, we have
qns (z
n
s )− qs (zns ) ≤ Πns (b)−Πs (b) .
Notice that, as the pricing kernel is linear, we can suppose that the there are no redundant se-
curities, or equivalently that portfolios are taken in the quotient space. If the sequence (zns )n∈N
in RJ remains bounded, we can assume that it converges to zs in RJ at no loss of generality.
This yields
0 ≤ lim
n→∞ q
n
s (z
n
s )− qs (zns ) ≤ limn→∞Π
n
s (b)−Πs (b) < 0,
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a contradiction. Otherwise, the sequence (z˜ns )n∈N in RJ is bounded, where
z˜ns =
1
‖zns ‖
zns .
Assuming convergence to z˜s in RJ at no loss of generality, we obtain
0 ≤ qs (z˜s) = lim
n→∞ q
n
s (z˜
n
s ) ≤ limn→∞
1
‖zns ‖
Πns (b) = 0
and, at every sˆ in S,
0 = lim
n→∞
1
‖zns ‖
dsˆ ≤ lim
n→∞Rs,sˆ (z˜
n
s ) = Rs,sˆ (z˜s) .
No arbitrage pricing so implies that Rs,sˆ (z˜s) = 0 for every sˆ in S. By no redundancies, z˜s is
the zero portfolio in RJ , which contradicts the fact that ‖z˜s‖ = 1. Q.E.D.
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